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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
leadership fraternity, was elected to student membership with a
scholastic average of 2.667. Mr. Downing, who is from Monroe,
Louisiana, was also the first recipient of the newly-established
"honor award" which is to be made annually to the outstanding
second year student in the law school. The 1944-45 selection is
Mrs. Evelyn Pritchard Cole of Dunn, Louisiana. This award
carries a scholarship of $30 per month during the remainder of
the recipient's course in the Law School.
DALE E. BENNETT,
Acting Dean.
Comments
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON STATUTE
TITLES IN LOUISIANA
Included in the constitution of forty-one states1 is what is
commonly termed a "title-body clause." This clause provides cer-
tain requirements for the title of a statute, certain requirements
for the body of the statute, and for a specified relationship be-
tween the title and the body of the statute. The title-body clause
found in the Louisiana Constitution is expressed in these words:
"Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but
one object, and shall have a title indicative of such object."
The historical evolution of the present-day title-body clause
began with the appearance of such a provision in the Georgia
Constitution of 1798.3 Its inclusion was due to the insistence of
General James Jackson, who led the fight against the famed
Yazoo Act of 1795, 4 which, by means of its deceptively innocent
title, passed the legislature with little difficulty. When the true
nature of the Yazoo Act was discovered the public indignation
1. The exceptions are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16.
3. Ga. Const. of 1798, Art. I, § 17. C. H. Manson gives a much more com-
plete historical background in "The Drafting of Statute Titles" (1934) 10 Ind.
L.J. 155.
4. The act was entitled: "An act supplementary to an Act, entitled 'An
Act for appropriating a part of the unlocated territory of this State for the
payment of the State troops, and for other purposes therein mentioned,'
declaring the right of this State to the unappropriated territory thereof for
the protection and support of the frontiers of this State, and for other
purposes."
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was great; for while the title of the act gave no indication of any
such purpose, one of the provisions granted full title to some thir-
ty-five million acres of public land to certain men for about one
and one-half cents an acre. Thereafter the constitutional conven-
tions of the various states usually included such a provision in the
instrument they were drafting. The use of the title-body clause
became so wide-spread that today it is a part of the constitutions
of forty-one states.5
Perhaps the dominant purpose of the title-body clause is to
prevent the fraud and surprise in the legislature which arises
when certain provisions of a statute are not indicated by its title.6
The requirement prevents the jockeying of bills through the legis-
lature under a misleading and deceitful title, and, as a corollary,
the public is apprised of the subject matter of the legislation
being considered. In addition, the requirement that a bill have
but one object defeats the old practice of "log-rolling, '7 which is
the bringing together of several measures of a different character
in one statute. This device was used to insure the passage of legis-
lation by combining several measures in one bill thus securing
the support of the advocates of each individual measure. It often
succeeded in cases where no one of the several measures could,
standing alone, secure passage on its own merit. Thus,the use of
these constitutional limitations is undoubtedly justified by the
abolition of those former evils of legislation.
The title-body clause first appeared in Louisiana as Article
118 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1845.8 The same language was
included as Article 115 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1852 and
as Article 118 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1864. A unique
clause was inserted in the Louisiana Constitution of 18689 which
provided for the legality of a law containing two or more ob-
jects.10 In 1879, however, the new constitution reverted to the
usual clause;1 and the Constitutions of 1898 and 1913 again offered
5. See note 1, supra.
6. For other expressions of the purposes of the title-body clause, see
Crawford, Statutory Construction (1940) 134, § 95; Manson, supra note 3, at
156; 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3 ed. 1943) 287, § 1702.
7. A more difficult form of "log-rolling" which is now practiced is the
combination for mutual strength of advocates of separate bills upon different
subjects.
8. The wording of the clause is similar to that of the present clause. The
1845 clause read: "Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but
one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."
9. La. Const. of 1868, Art. 114, read: "Every law shall express its object
or objects in its title."
10. This is technically known as duality or plurality.
11. La. Const. of 1879, Art. 29.
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the usual clause, which was Article 31 in each. The title-body
clause is now designated as Article III, Section.16, of our present
Louisiana Constitution of 1921.
The constitutional limitation has been uniformly held to be
mandatory upon the legislature in Louisiana,12 which is in accord
with the weight of authority.13 The power of the legislature is
thereby limited, and any statute failing to comply with the pro-
vision is void. However, rigorous and technical constructions of
the limitations are avoided-the tendency being toward liberality
of construction with the view of hampering as little as possible
the legislative will. 4
The title of a statute must be "indicative"" of the object of
the statute. Since this term is susceptible of several interpreta-
tions, considerable confusion has arisen regarding the composition
of statute titles. To clarify the situation an examination of the
cases dealing with statute titles and their content is necessary.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana repeatedly has held that the
title of a statute conforms to the constitutional requirement when
that title indicates the general purpose of the statute in a clear
manner.0 One of the earlier cases which settled this question
declared: ". . . but surely it is not necessary at this late day to say
that the title of an act need not be a synopsis of is [sic] contents.
It is sufficient if it indicate the general object or purpose of the
law without signifying each provision made therein.' 1 7 Another
12. State v. Heywood, 38 La. Ann. 689 (1886); Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La.
146, 5 So.(2d) 531 (1941).
13. Crawford, op. cit. supra note 6, at 135, § 95; 1 Sutherland, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 291, § 1703.
14. State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 58 So. 411 (1912); Ramey v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 200 So. 333 (La. App. 1941). See Jackson v. Hart, 192 La. 1068,
190 So. 220 (1939), and quotation from that case in footnote 15, infra.
15. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16. Commenting upon the effect of the
change in wording of this provision wrought by the 1921 Constitution, Justice
Rogers, in Jackson v. Hart, 192 La. 1068, 1073, 190 So. 220, 221 (1939), said:
"The effect of the changing of the wording of the constitutional provision
was to relax the previous requirement that the statute must 'express' its
object, so now all that is required is that the title of the statute should be
'indicative' of its object. The constitutional provision must be construed
broadly rather than narrowly with a view of effectuating, not of frustrating,
the legislative purpose. This is the rule prevailing everywhere for the
construction of such a constitutional provision."
16. Some of the later cases are State v. Craig, 158 La. 866, 104 So. 744
(1925); Airey v. Tugwell, 197 La. 982, 3 So.(2d) 99 (1941); Ramey v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 200 So. 333 (La. App. 1941), cited supra note 14, an exceptionally
well reasoned opinion; Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341,
8 So.(2d) 49 (1942).
17. Louisiana Board of Trustees of the American Printing House for the
Blind v. Dupuy, 37 La. Ann. 188, 191 (1885).
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excerpt from one of the typical decisions reads: "There is no
necessity of the title being a complete index to every section of
the act. It is only necessary that it shall, in general terms, direct
attention to the purpose of the law; . .. 18 Hence, it will be seen
that Louisiana is in accord with the weight of authority, to the
effect that the title of a statute need not be a complete index,
synopsis, epitome, abstract or catalogue, nor need it set out the
details of the act.' 9
All provisions of the enactment which are germane to the
subject matter need not be particularly mentioned in the title.
Such details as the means and instrumentalities provided for the
accomplishment of the purpose of the statute (the "modus
operandi") need not be included in the title.20 Material which is
germane to the act, but which is "unusual" or "extraordinary,"2 1
must be indicated by the title in such a manner as to inform the
public. For example, according to the title of Act 115 of 1928,22
the statute provided for the exemption from garnishment of a
portion of the wages of all employees and the method by which
the non-exempt portion might be garnished, yet the body of the
statute introduced a radical change in our laws by allowing
garnishment of future credits and rights, which had never before
been allowed in Louisiana. The Supreme Court in Surety Credit
Company v. Tieman2  rightly held the title violative of the con-
stitutional limitation on the grounds that such an innovation in
our law should be particularly mentioned in the title of the sta-
tute in order to fairly apprise the public of the change.
The criterion would seem to be that the title of a statute is
sufficient if it puts those who are to be affected by the act upon
inquiry into its contents by fairly indicating the "objects" of the
18. State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 624, 58 So. 411, 412 (1912).
19. From Crawford, op. cit. supra note 6, at 142, § 99. "Hence, an elab-
orate statement Is not required, or, in fact, desirable. Indeed a few well
chosen words suggestive of the general subject is always to be preferred."
From 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 6, at 307, § 1714: "A title need
not fully express what Is contained in the body of an act. It is not essential
that the best, or even a highly accurate caption be affixed, provided that the
legislative purpose is suggested in a general way."
20. Edwards v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, 39 La. Ann. 855, 2 So. 804 (1887);
Thornhill v. Wear, 131 La. 479, 59 So. 909 (1912).
21. C. H. Manson terms this extraordinary matter "germane in the second
degree." Manson, supra note 3, at 160.
-'MTThe title reads: "Providing an exemption from seizure and garnish-
ment of a portion of the wages or salaries of all laborers, wage earners, or
employees, of any kind, whether skilled or unskilled; and providing the pro-
cedure by which the portion not exempt may be seized and garnisheed."
23. 171 La- 581, 131 So. 678 (1930).
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law.24 The object of a statute has been held to be the "aim or pur-
pose of the enactment"; 25 or, expressed differently, it is the "mat-
ter or thing forming the groundwork of the act. '26 Assuming that
the object of the statute is expressed in such a manner as to
provoke inquiry, still a further restriction is that the title must
not mislead nor be such as to take one by surprise.27 The matter
is concisely stated in Airey v. Tugwell as follows: ". . . the title of
an act of the Legislature is of the nature of a label, the purpose
of which is to give notice of the legislative intent and purpose to
those interested in, or who may be affected by, the terms of the
act, and to prevent surprise and fraud upon members of the
Legislature. ' '28
Three excellent examples of titles which fully meet the re-
quirements of Article III; Section 16, 29are the titles of the Uniform
Business Corporations Act, 0 the Uniform Narcotics Act,21 and
the Louisiana Criminal Code. 2 The title of the Uniform Business
Corporations Act reads:
"To provide for the Incorporation, Regulation, Merger,
Consolidation and Dissolution of Certain Corporations for
Profit; to Provide Penalties for the Violation of Certain Sec-
tions Hereof; and to Repeal Certain Laws and All Other Laws
Inconsistent Herewith."'
The statute was designed to, and does in fact, cover the whole
subject matter of certain corporations from incorporation to dis-
solution. There are a multitude of provisions in the lengthy
statute,22 yet the title is short and concise; it expresses the object
of the statute clearly, which is to provide for a system of law to
control specified corporations; it is not misleading, and it puts
those persons affected thereby upon inquiry as to its contents. The
title is complete and sufficient and has been held to have com-
24. See State ex rel. California Co. v. Jefferson and Plaquemines Drainage
District, 194 La. 312, 193 So. 657 (1939).
25. State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 250, 28 So. 917, 918, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123,
124 (1900).
26. Airey v. Tugwell, 197 La. 982, 991, 3 So.(2d) 99, 102 (1941).
27. Thornhill v. Wear, 131 La. 479, 59 So. 909 (1912).
28. 197 La. 982, 991, 3 So.(2d) 99, 102 (1941).
29. La. Const. of 1921.
30. La. Act 250 of 1928, as amended by La. Act 65 of 1932 [Dart's Stats.
1942) §§ 1080, 1094]; La. Act 34 of 1935 (4 E.S.).
31. La. Act 14 of 1934 (2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1942) §§ 2162.1-2162.61.
32. La. Act 43 of 1942.
33. La. Act 250 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1942) §§ 1080-1084, 1086-1154] con-
tains 74 sections and covers 52 pages of printed matter in the acts of 1928.
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plied with the constitutional limitation34 upon contest of the valid-
ity of several sections of the statute.3 5
The title of the Uniform Narcotics Act 36 is in the following
language:
"Providing for the regulation and control of the sale,
prescribing, dispensing, dealing in, and distribution of narcotic
drugs, defining and relating to narcotic drugs and to make
uniform the law with reference thereto, and prescribing penal-
ties for the violation of this Act."
Although the statute is not as lengthy as the preceding statute,
it is complex in its provisions." Its title, however, is incomplex,
being constructed in the best modem tradition and has been
declared within the limitations of Article III, Section 16.38
The title of the Louisiana Criminal Code,39 prepared by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, necessarily contains the usual
retroactive, repealing, retaining and constitutionality provisos.
Other than that, the title to this very comprehensive statute
40
succinctly states that it is the purpose of the enactment,
"To adopt a Criminal Code for the State of Louisiana;
defining certain crimes, and fixing penalties for the violations
thereof; providing .... " .
The constitutionality of this title has recently been upheld .by
the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of State v. Pete.41
Conclusion
In conclusion, it appears that a statute title must meet three
requirements: (1) It must indicate the object of the statute; (2) it
must avoid being misleading or deceitful; (3) the statutory object
34. La. Const. of 1921, Art..III, § 16.
35. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 39 [Dart's Stats. (1942) § 11191 was declared
valid within the meaning of La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16, in Tichenor v.
Tichenor, 184 La. 743, 167 So. 427 (1936). Section 74 of the act was declared
valid in Ramey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 200 So. 333 (La. App. 1941), cited
supra note 16. The indisputable implication was that the act was valid in its
entirety.
36. La. Act 14 of 1934 (2 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1942) § 2162.1-2162.61.
37. La. Act 14 of 1934 (2 E.S.) contains 26 sections and covers 14 pages of
printed matter in the acts of 1934.
38. State v. Martin, 192 La. 704, 189 So. 109 (1939). Section 2 of the act
was contested and the ruling pertained to that provision, but the implication
was that the entire act was undoubtedly valid.
39. La. Act 43 of 1942.
40. La. Act 43 of 1942 is not printed in the acts of 1942, but is published
in a separate volume containing 171 pages of printed matter.
41. La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37232 (October 1944).
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must be indicated in such a manner as to provoke inquiry among
those persons affected thereby. A number of our statutes comply
with these requisites, but are of woeful composition-redundant
and repetitious, laboriously lengthy, and of Such complexity as to
approach the unintelligible. The modern tradition in drafting
statute titles calls for simple, direct language containing a short,
concise statement of the object. As has been shown above, there
is no constitutional objection in Louisiana to the direct, concise
title. Such a title is commendable because of its undeniable worth
to the bar, to the bench, and to the laity.
B. NEWTON HARGIS*
THE SHORT FORM INDICTMENT ,
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
The common law indictment was, and is, in those jurisdictions
still using it, a mass of verbose and technical allegations. An ac-
cumulation of "to wits," "then and theres," and "aforesaids" has
not served to expedite the administration of justice. An accused
may be convicted of the offense charged after a full and fair trial
upon the merits, and then have the judgment reversed because
of a technically insufficient or defective allegation.'
The complex and technical form of the indictment served a
very useful purpose during the period when the rules of criminal
procedure were formulated. In the time of Blackstone there were
one hundred and sixty capital offenses.' Consequently, many
judges were very zealous in searching out and discovering tech-
nical insufficiencies in order to prevent injustice in cases where
the punishment was grossly excessive in light of the offense com-
mitted.3 The prosecutors of that period, to combat this judicial
leniency, attempted to formulate indictments which would be
unimpeachable. Naturally the charge became highly technical
and involved. Another substantial argument for the long form
indictment was that the accused was furnished as a basis for his
defense only what he could gather from a reading of the indict-
ment to him at the arraignment. He could neither see the indict-
ment nor receive a copy of it.4
* Associate editor, Louis4ana Law Reiew, 1943-1944.
1. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (1766-1769) 18.
2. Chitty, Criminal Law (3 ed. 1836) 114.
8. Perkins, Short Indictments and Informations (1929) 15 A.B.A.J. 292.
4. 1 Chitty, op. cit. supra note 2, at 403.
[Vol. VI
